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Abstract
The Trans-Pacific Partnership is on its way to becoming the largest trade deal ever
made and proposes to write the rules for global trade. The TPP includes several novelties in
trade negotiation such as a chapter specifically interested in issues surrounding development.
This paper offers a content-based analysis of the TPP’s Development chapter to gauge
the value of this symbolic addition. In order to make this assessment, the United Nations
Conference for Trade and Development, the intergovernmental organization responsible
for assisting developing nations in the negotiation of trade deals, serves as a reference
point for the representation of developing nations’ interests and the agenda for international
development. Our first finding is that the Development chapter is not inconsistent with the
UNCTAD’s charter, but is too imprecise to represent an effective negotiation tool for the
benefit of the TPP’s developing members. Extending beyond the Development chapter, our
second finding is that other chapters in the TPP, such as the Intellectual Property chapter
and the Investment chapter, paradoxically present clear obstructions to developmental
national policies, so that the TPP needs to be reworked to provide more negotiation power
and preferential treatment to its developing members in order to base future trade deals on
a more level footing and go beyond the standards enacted by former mega-regional trade
deals.
“The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) writes the rules for global trade,” is the
opening statement on the official United States’ website dedicated to the largest regional
trade deal in history awaiting ratification by the United States’ Congress. The TPP has
received extensive coverage in the media precisely because of its ambitious agenda and
its size. The 12 member nations along the Pacific Rim currently participating in the TPP
account for almost 40% of the world economy, and the number of nations that have expressed
interest in joining continues to increase. The TPP is the first trade deal to include a chapter
on development, an important addition as it proposes to set the standard for global trade.
Including development in the global trade agenda is central to mending global economic
disparities between the North and the Global South and pursuing sustainable development,
especially with the diversity in levels of development between member nations. The
TPP’s symbolic incorporation of a chapter on development is progressive to the extent
that it pursues the international standards set forth for development by intergovernmental
organisms. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is the
international body that promotes development through international trade. It has assisted
developing countries in the negotiation of trade deals since 1964 and will serve as the point
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of departure in considering the value of the TPP’s chapter on development based on its
content. While the TPP and the UNCTAD’s positions on development are not incompatible
per se, the TPP contains clauses that could paradoxically be detrimental to the development
of its least developed members whose interests must be more firmly buttressed if the TPP is
to go beyond a mega-regional trade deal based in American corporate interest.
In order to contextualize the UNCTAD’s current position on trade and development
here follows a brief overview of the organization’s history. The United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development was first held in 1964 as a response to the growing concern
about the place of developing countries in the initial motions of international trade. The
conference was institutionalized to meet every four years as a result of the acknowledgement
of the unique positioning of developing countries and their need for representation. Since
its formation, the UNCTAD has gone through three phases of existence marked by
institutional changes brought about by multiple crises that affected the global economy
and prompted the reconfiguration of the relation between labor and capital1. The first phase
of the UNCTAD unfolded in the context of the Welfare State characterized by the state’s
central role in the maintenance of national demand and closed economies. The welfare
state molded the organization’s pro-development ambitions between the 1960s and the
1990s. The crisis of the welfare state in the 1970s, however, caused the subordination of the
state to the global flow of capital, a process embodied by the creation of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 1995. The increase in global capital flows propelled the UNCTAD’s
second phase during which it supplanted its pro-development role for a seemingly converse
function as the WTO’s negotiation platform with developing countries. In this phase the
UNCTAD promoted the signature of free trade agreements and provided technical assistance
to developing countries in the liberalization of the production process and the circulation of
capital. Following the crisis of the neoliberal state in the 1990s and early 2000s however,
the UNCTAD began to question the correlation between the signature of bilateral trade
agreements and the influx of foreign direct investment (FDI). The UNCTAD’s third and
current phase marked a return to its initial role as assistant to the state as a regulatory
framework to foreign investment. The UNCTAD upheld state regulation, with a demand
in 2003 for increased national policy space, referring to the recognition of the sovereign
state’s right to regulate and pursue FDIs in the scope of national development policies, and
the emergence in 2012 of a New Generation of Investment Policies (NGIPs), anchored
in the necessity for investments to foster inclusive growth and sustainable development
generating responsible investment and corporate responsibility. The UNCTAD believes
there exists a conflict between the resignation of a nation’s sovereignty induced by the
signing of bilateral trade agreements and a nation’s necessity to implement developmental
policies. The UNCTAD’s current undertaking is the renegotiation of these agreements to
include a sustainable development dimension.2
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a multilateral free trade agreement between
Ghiotto, Luciana, “¿UNCTAD pro-desarrollo o pro-liberalización? Un estudio de
los cambios en el organismo a la luz de las políticas sobre inversiones,” 5
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twelve Pacific Rim countries that “promotes economic integration to liberalize trade and
investment.”3 The TPP contains thirty chapters covering trade and trade-related issues,
from textiles to labor standards. It is one of the largest trade deals ever written, and is
considered by the United States government as complementary to the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the European Union.
The current member states of the TPP are, in order of entrance into negotiations, Singapore,
Brunei, New Zealand, Chile, the United States, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia,
Mexico, Canada, and Japan. Several more countries have expressed interest in joining the
partnership however, which is technically open to any country. There are ongoing debates
about the exclusion of China, the world’s largest manufacturer, from the trade deal. Some
argue it is crucial for the United States to counterbalance China’s influence in the region,
while others say that China’s dominance in the region is inevitable4. China’s exclusion,
and that of the BRICS, has also been argued to provide increased negotiation power to
the United States and to hasten the deal negotiations. The partnership’s principle aims
are familiar from past trade deals, that is, lowering trade barriers to facilitate commerce
between member nations, but goes beyond prior deals in its attempt to reduce non-tariff
barriers as well as tariffs.
The TPP claims to be the first trade agreement to contain a chapter on development.
The Development chapter however, twenty-third in the TPP, lacks real policies and gives
the impression of rhetorical sugarcoating for a trade deal based in a singular nation’s
interest rather than a concrete advancement in the negotiation power of developing nations.
It is not directly incompatible with sustainable development or responsible investment
policies found in WTO and UNCTAD charters, but the imprecision of the Development
chapter’s clauses indicates a lack of commitment to the effectual implementation of
sustainable development and broad-based economic growth. The chapter consists of a
series of generalities about the relationship between investment and development, such
as “The Parties further recognize that transparency, good governance and accountability
contribute to the effectiveness of development policies”5. The wording of the articles
themselves lacks substance, as most articles began with “The Parties acknowledge” or “The
Parties recognize,” and followed by generalized statements on a nation’s right to pursue
developmental policies. The “acknowledgement” and “recognition” of such rights pales in
comparison to the wording of the chapter on the Investment chapter, the breadth of which
can be traced down to its reading time of 69 minutes opposed to the Development chapter’s
10 minutes. In the Investment chapter, clauses contain explicit deadlines, references to
external legal texts and bodies, and an overall exactitude absent from the Development
chapter.
The only policy put forth in the Development chapter is the creation of a Committee
on Development composed of representatives from each party, or member nation, whose
role would be to “consider ways that the Chapter may enhance the development benefits
Trans-Pacific Partnership, Preamble.
Caro, Felipe and Christopher S. Tang, “Leaving Chine out of the TPP is a terrible mistake.” Fortune. 06 Oct. 2015.
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of this Agreement,”6 which the chapter itself fails to consider. The Development chapter
states it goes hand in hand with the Cooperating and Capacity Building chapter, an
equally imprecise text that also proposes a Committee to both create and implement its
goals, resulting in a bureaucratic overlap with little leeway in the legal mire of the text
as a whole. While it is ingenuous to think a trade deal would focus on development over
the facilitation of commerce through the lowering of trade barriers, it is deplorable that
perhaps the largest trade deal ever made, with the pretention of reforming global trade,
so plainly favors a singular member’s interest, the United States’. One would think that a
chapter on development would address the interests of the less developed members, such
as Cambodia, Vietnam, and Malaysia, and yet it is United States-centric in that the impetus
for the development of the Asia Pacific region is to generate “more prosperous societies
and stronger markets for America’s goods and services.”7 Finally, the symbolic advance
this chapter makes towards the pursuit of sustainable development in the global trade
agenda is negated by a condition that states, “In the event of any inconsistency between
this Chapter and another Chapter of this Agreement, the other Chapter shall prevail to
the extent of the inconsistency.”8 This statement renders the TPP’s Development chapter
inferior to any of the other chapters in the deal, not only in terms of maneuvering capacity,
but also in legal terms, as the final clause of the chapter states, “No Party shall have
recourse to dispute settlement under Chapter 28 [Dispute Settlement] for any matter arising
under this Chapter.”9 Therefore, a development policy would not justify the imposition of
trade barriers, and such policies would be legally sanctioned. Rather than representing a
symbolic advance in the constitution of trade deals and a step in the direction of policy space
promoted by UNCTAD, the Development chapter, made up of undeniable generalities and
a bureaucratic gesture, serves to underline the unilateral interest that drives the deal.
While the imprecision of the Development chapter in the TPP attests to the
secondary positioning of the concern for sustainable development, it does not pose
impediments to development on its own, that is, the chapter does not clash with the
UNCTAD’s perspective on development. Other chapters of the treaty however, such as
the Intellectual Property chapter and the Investment chapter, do present direct barriers to
development, and are consistently mentioned by the deal’s critics as factors that refrain
national policymaking and thereby reduce national sovereignty. First, the Intellectual
Property chapter is a controversial chapter that critics warn of which could restrict access
to medication in developing nations by implementing a higher standard “one-size-fitsall10” set of international intellectual property laws, meaning that property laws currently
confined by national frontiers would extend to foreign territories. The concept of intellectual
property is a central incentive for innovation and the operation of market forces, but the
TPP may overturn the flexibility of the current international intellectual property laws for
Trans-Pacific Partnership, 23.7.2.f
Trans-Pacific Partnership, 23 Summary
Trans-Pacific Partnership, 23.8
Trans-Pacific Partnership, 23.9.
Flynn, Sean M., Brook Baker, Margot Kaminski, and Jimmy Koo, “The U.S.
Proposal For An Intellectual Property Chapter In The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.” American University Washington College of Law (2015).
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pharmaceuticals set out by the World Intellectual Property Organization that allows nations
to mold medical policies to meet their needs. Doctors Without Borders writes, “The TPP
agreement is on track to become the most harmful trade pact ever for access to medicines
in developing countries.” The TPP considers extending the intellectual property rights on
certain branded drugs, especially on innovative “biologics,” drugs grown from live cells
with a high potential in the treatment of cancer11, with an eight-year period of protection for
the data collected in the development process of a drug. This could undermine the effort to
contain the cost of medication made in the United States and delay the production of more
affordable generic drugs and “biosimilars” and their access to people in developing nations
of the Pacific Rim, thus increasing global inequality in access to health. States should be
able to ensure the public health interests of their citizens and a provision that could harm
the access to medications would undermine this responsibility. The economist Sean Flynn
adds,
The proposal would make these changes in the context of a new and powerful
dispute resolution system that would greatly expand the standing, venue, and
causes of action that could be used to challenge domestic policies, including
through actions by corporations directly against states. This is, in short, an
incredibly unbalanced proposal emanating from an extraordinarily imbalanced
process.12
The above conclusion segues into the most controversial element of the TPP, the
Investor-State Dispute Settlement mechanism.
The Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism is a product of the
Investment chapter, and relates to disputes between private corporations and governments,
as opposed to the Settlement Dispute chapter that governs disputes between governments.
ISDS is a direct threat to policies aimed at development. According to the United States’
version of the TPP, the Investment chapter “deters foreign governments from imposing
discriminatory or abusive requirements on American investors,13” principally through the
ISDS mechanism, an international system whereby a multinational corporation (MNC)
based in a TPP member nation can sue the sovereign government of another member nation,
in which they have invested, for infringing upon their property rights. Why do nations
accept these potentially constricting terms? The capital accumulation model is based on the
liquidity of capital and its unrestricted flow on a global level14, and since the 1990s most
bilateral trade treaties signed contain ISDS arrangements under which ad hoc international
arbitration tribunals investigate whether an MNC deserves compensation from the nation
under prosecution. Nations agree in the clauses of these arrangements not to interfere with
Calmes, Jackie, “Pacific Trade Deal Talks Resume, Under Fire From U.S. Presidential Hopefuls.” The New York Times. 30 Sept. 2015.
12
Flynn, Sean M., Brook Baker, Margot Kaminski, and Jimmy Koo, “The U.S.
Proposal For An Intellectual Property Chapter In The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.” American University Washington College of Law (2015).
13
Trans-Pacific Partnership, 9 Summary.
14
Ghiotto, Luciana, “Los tratados bilaterales de inversión y la protección a las
inversiones: un análisis del caso argentino,” 253.
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foreign investment in order to facilitate its profitability, thus attracting capital, inserting
themselves in the global market and guaranteeing better positioning in global power
relations15. In short, nations accept this legal practice to reassure foreign investors of the
safety of their investment and attract more investment. These cases may be brought to the
World Bank’s International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), a
legal body that crystalizes capital’s pursuit of certainty through the law.16 Since 1990, over
100 different nations, most of which are developing nations, have been sued over 550
times, and won about one third of the time17. The United States, however, has never lost
a case. Most United States’ corporations win their cases against foreign governments and
they are increasingly extracting advantages from ISDS clauses. This is one of the reasons
“the US is demanding such provisions in the TPP, even though many of its “partners” have
property protections and judicial systems that are as good as its own.18”
Corporations consider that ISDS mechanisms depoliticize dispute settlements
and ensure the free flow of capital in the capital accumulation model, which requires a
complex legal web to protect foreign direct investments in unregulated neoliberal fluxes.
The controversy is that ISDS mechanisms subject governments to foreign corporations,
and place economic growth above social policies, both detrimental to sustainable
development, by preventing the implementation of public policies that conflict with private
foreign investment. What MNCs consider to be a violation of their property rights is a
nation’s attempt at legitimizing government regulation. Take for example the Uruguay vs.
Philip Morris case, in which the tobacco company is currently litigating the Uruguayan
government for implementing anti-smoking legislation that hurt its cigarette sales.
Investment arbitration cases can cost millions of dollars to litigate and further entrench a
developing nation in debt. Furthermore, the ISDS mechanism is a one-way street in which
corporations may sue nations but not the other way around. “If there is a violation of other
commitments – on labor and environmental standards, for example – citizens, unions, and
civil-society groups have no recourse.”19 While the TPP’s ISDS mechanism is not a novelty
in international trade, the entrenchment of this legal structure in the trade deal to lead the
path for all future trade deals further orients economic governance towards the insurance
of corporate interests. Surely nations have a right to defend their interests and ensure the
profitability of their investments, but the ISDS mechanism is a slippery slope towards
market discipline imposing itself on national sovereignty20 and undermining democratic
processes. In its 2015 World Investment Report, the UNCTAD demonstrated wariness
Ghiotto, 259.
Ghiotto, 263.
Rachel Wellhausen, Assistant Professor of Government at the University of
Texas at Austin, for The Washington Post.
18
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towards international investment agreements, acknowledging their role in the safety of
an investment climate and the facilitation of cross-border investment, but underlying
experience has shown that IIAs “bite” (i.e. their protection provisions can and have been
enforced by arbitral tribunals at sometimes huge costs to the State), and that – like any
other international treaty – they limit the regulatory space of the contracting parties. As
a result, concerns have been raised that these limits on regulatory space go too far, were
not properly understood at the point of entry into IIAs or are inadequately balanced by
safeguards for governments or by obligations on MNEs. 21
Whether or not preferential trade agreements such as the TPP between nations
increase the influx of foreign direct investments is a fundamental debate in the realm of
international trade. While the signature of a free trade agreement by a developing nation
can attract capital and spur industrialization, “economic growth is one aspect of the process
of economic development.”22 Less developed nations feel compelled to lower trade barriers
and accept investor-state dispute settlements to attract capital, but they are not sufficiently
represented in the negotiation of the agreements and lack the infrastructure to deal with the
legal consequences of these provisions. Many of the TPP’s members already have bilateral
free trade agreements with each other, which suggests that there may be little effect on
tariff preferences but that these novel chapters based on trade regulation rather than trade
liberalization will in fact set new standards that are more constricting for governments
than in the past. In an increasingly regionalized division of the production process, the
TPP will also change how trade deals are negotiated. The TPP was negotiated between
member nations directly rather than within intergovernmental bodies such as the World
Trade Organization or the UNCTAD, which undermines these negotiation forums and the
interests of the developing nations that are better represented within them. Developing
nations need these organizations to support their interests and ensure that the outcomes of
global trade rules benefit them. The TPP however was designed by developed nations with
their own interests in mind, which has been normalized by previous free trade agreements,
but if the TPP affects to transfigure the norms of global trade, it must level the negotiation
ground between its developed and underdeveloped members and allocate preferential
treatment accordingly, rather than impartially lowering barriers to trade.
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